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"[I want to] make my personal judgment known, a judgment based on my own 
observations."1
Policing may have been the dirtiest, most difficult, and most unrewarding job in 
the Dutch East Indies' late colonial state, but to the Indonesian and European officers 
of the police force, it was also a window to progress. Indonesians2 formed the majority 
(96 percent) of the modern police force that operated in the Dutch East Indies during 
the 1920s and 1930s, and most of them filled the lower ranks. To them, service as a
1 Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta (hereafter ANRI), Archief Binnenlands Bestuur (hereafter 
BB), inv. no. 3592, Roesad gelar Soetan Perpatih to the head of the district criminal investigation 
department in Padang, May 4,1933. An earlier draft of this article, since then revised and further 
developed, has been published in Dutch. See Marieke Bloembergen, "Een ideale politieman. Politie, 
beschaving en geweten in Sumatra's Westkust," Het koloniale beschavingsoffensief: Wegen naar het nieuzve 
Indie, 1890-1950, ed. Marieke Bloembergen and Remco Raben (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2009), pp. 54^82.
1 thank Beverley Jackson for the translation of that earlier version, and Michael Peletz and the reviewer 
from Indonesia for their comments.
2 Although the word "Indonesia" was common in the 1920s, I am aware of the fact that it is an 
anachronism to talk of "Indonesians" at this time, but it seems to be the most practical solution for 
describing an all-encompassing police force. Indigenous policemen were recruited from the whole of the 
Dutch East Indies; the majority came from Java. In an ironic way, the colonial police force may have 
contributed to the creation of an imagined greater Indonesia among its indigenous members.
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policeman offered the possibility of a fixed salary, a limited career, a uniform, and 
status. To a limited few—the sons of the Indonesian elite, and the more highly 
educated—the police force, however, offered more than that. These happy few had 
(restricted) access to the higher ranks, and this access increased during and after the 
late 1920s. Policing, for some, could also be an intellectual challenge, a chance to be a 
participant-observer of radical change in colonial society, while paradoxically, at the 
same time, playing a role in the suppression of change. The colonial police, therefore, 
may be an interesting source to study if we seek to understand both the functioning of 
the colonial state and the multiple meanings of modernity—or "how modernity was 
being used and why"—in colonial society.3 This will be the double focus of this article. 
Its underlying aim is to gain further insight into the colonial nature of policing in the 
Dutch East Indies.
Someone who understood the intellectual challenge of policing very well was the 
Minangkabau-born Roesad gelar Soetan Perpatih, who, from 1929 until 1939, served as 
wedana of police in the district criminal investigation department (gewestelijke recherche) 
of the West Coast of Sumatra.4 In May 1929, Roesad started a writing project of his 
own, wishing to produce a clear account of the religious and political movements that 
had made Minangkabau society in this region so combustible over the previous few 
decades.5 The project was entirely his own idea, and was not prompted by his 
superiors, but he based his work on the methods of modern Western scholarship. This 
would be the first in a series of reports he produced on his own initiative between 1929 
and 1934, quite unrelated to the monthly political police reports he was required to 
submit about indigenous meetings and associations. Together, his independent reports 
make up a remarkable corpus, which may be read as a study of religion, politics, and 
modernism in Minangkabau society, most notably in relation to the needs and 
requirements of the late-colonial state. Roesad wanted his own views on these matters 
to be known.6
Roesad was the perfect officer for the political police, or at least that was the verdict 
of his superior, the resident of Sumatra's West Coast, B. H. F. van Heuven.7 A capable
3 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2005), p. 115.
4 Wedana was a rank in the local indigenous administrative corps, or pangreh praja, as well as a specific 
position, namely that of district chief. Wedana of police was a position of similar rank and status within the 
colonial police force. The gewestelijke recherche (referred to hereafter as district criminal investigation 
department) was set up in the early 1920s with a primarily political focus.
5 ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3592, Nota over de godsdienstig-politieke beweging ter Sumatra's Westkust 
(Memorandum on the religious political movements on Sumatra's West Coast), June 3,1929, by Roesad 
gelar Soetan Perpatih (hereafter Roesad). Gelar indicates a title passed down matrilineally. Deliar Noer,
The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 37.
6 The report named in the previous note was the first one that Roesad produced explicitly to publicize his 
"personal judgment." See also ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3952, "Rapport over het onderwijs aan 
godsdienstscholen, in verband met de ontdekkingen tijdens de huiszoekingen in September 1933" (Report 
on education at religious schools, in connection with the police searches in September 1933), October 18, 
1933; and ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3952, "Het modernisme in penghoeloekringen" (Modernism among the 
penghulu), November 6,1933. Roesad composed both of these reports.
7 As will be explained below, the modern colonial police force, which at the time was called the general 
police force, included, since the police reforms of 1918-1920, special divisions for the task of political 
policing. These special political police divisions had to report, via the local police head (the resident), to the 
attorney general, who led the centralized Intelligence Service, or Algemeene Recherchedienst (General 
Criminal Investigation Service, ARD) in Batavia, on all social and political meetings, associations, and
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officer of this branch had to possess social intelligence, acute powers of observation, 
and a wide interest in society. Roesad had all these qualities, which meant he also 
reflected the contradictions inherent in his position: he was fascinated by the profound 
social changes of his time, which he observed perceptively and, to some extent, 
applauded. As a police officer, however, he also helped to block the political changes 
that struck fear into the hearts of the colonial administrators. For all his detached desire 
for understanding, his reports were far from innocuous. They provided the basis and 
arguments—probably directly—for the ban on meetings and gatherings and for the 
arrests of the leaders of two religious political organizations, the Persatuan Muslim 
Indonesia (Permi, United Muslims of Indonesia) and the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia 
(PSII, the Islamic Association Party of Indonesia), which took place in the summer of 
1933 on Van Heuven's orders.8
It is interesting to compare Roesad's ideas on the relationship between social and 
religious change and local radical politics with developments in the scholarly literature 
on popular radicalism published since the 1950s. Such an inquiry will further this 
article's attempt to understand how "modernity" and its radical edges were 
experienced and used at the time Roesad was writing. While early studies on the 
nationalist and radical movements in the Dutch East Indies tended to understand 
popular radicalism mainly as an antagonistic reaction to colonial politics, the attention 
towards local area studies since the 1960s has (ironically enough) broadened and 
complicated the perspective; since the early 1990s, partly inspired by Takashi 
Shiraishi's An Age in Motion, scholars have tried to understand radicalism also in the 
context of a more general indigenous movement towards progress, or the pergerakan9 10
Roesad looked at the problem of modernity from a perspective concerned with the 
interests of the colonial state, but precisely because of his efforts, at the same time, to 
problematize "modernity" in general, he seems to provide an interpretative framework 
that might still have appeal to those well versed in recent historiography on this topic.
In this article, I postulate that the case of Roesad can help scholars understand the 
multiple experiences of modernity in the Dutch East-Indies even further, and on a 
more theoretical level,1" precisely because of the fact that Roesad enables us to make a 
shift in perspective—namely, from the perspective of the Indonesians being policed
activities in colonial society. These political police divisions were: the political investigation departments 
in the larger cities, and the gewestelijke recherche (or district criminal investigation department) at the 
regional level, in which Roesad served. However, members of other divisions of the general police, like the 
veldpolitie (fieldpolice, set up in 1918), and the administrative police (dating from the nineteenth century) 
were involved in political policing as well.
8 Audrey R. Kahin, "Repression and Regroupment: Religious and Nationalist Organizations in West 
Sumatra in the 1930s," Indonesia 38 (October 1984): 39-40.
9 Especially, Jeffrey Alan Hadler, Muslims and Matriarchs: Cultural Resilience in Indonesia through Jihad and 
Colonialism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); John R. Bowen, Sumatran Politics and Poetics: Gayo 
History, 1900-1989 (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1991); Takashi Shiraishi, An Age in Motion: Popular 
Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Taufik Abdullah, "Islam, History 
and Social Change in Minangkabau," in Change and Continuity in Minangkabau: Local, Regional, and 
Historical Perspectives on West-Sumatra, ed. Lynn L. Thomas and Franz von Benda Beckman (Athens, OH: 
Ohio University Center for International Studies, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), pp. 141-55; 
and James T. Siegel, The Rope of God (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969).
10 Cf. Cooper, Colonialism in Question, pp. 142-49; Marieke Bloembergen and Remco Raben, "Wegen naar 
het nieuwe Indie, 1890-1950," in Het koloniale beschavingsoffensief: Wegen naar het nieuwe Indie, 1890-1950, ed. 
Marieke Bloembergen and Remco Raben (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2009), pp. 8-15.
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towards that of the Indonesian policeman. Most studies on indigenous progressive or 
radical movements—with important exceptions11—ignore the fact that the local search 
for progress and modernity did not only entail anticolonial nationalism or radicalism, 
but could also imply that the person searching would become involved in colonial 
politics.12 This perspective, that of an Indonesian aiming to be a perfect policeman— 
restricted by the boundaries of colonial hierarchical structures—will be key to this 
article, for such a lens can illuminate further the complexities of colonial society in 
times of (radical) change, and thus clarify what made colonial policing colonial.
In the historiography of the Dutch East Indies, until recently, scant attention has 
been paid to the colonial police, certainly in comparison to more extensive studies of 
police in the historiography of the British Empire since the 1980s.1 Since the 1970s, 
however, the reports produced by the colonial political police in the Dutch East Indies 
have been plumbed as rich source material for studies on indigenous protest 
movements, popular radicalism, and the nationalist movement, the preferred focus of 
attention for social historians and Indonesian historiographers.14 As a result of this
11 See for exceptions: Siegel, Rope of God, pp. 88-90; see also Hadler, Muslims and Matriarchs, who, by 
offering a smart, multiply contextualized analysis of schools, adat, religion, private life, and critical 
thinking among the Minangkabau, makes this point. However, Hadler addresses the relative lack of 
attention that has been paid by scholars to non-radical, yet progressive developments by considering these 
developments in the context of the house and the family. He pays less attention to those members of the 
Minangkabau elite, who were equally interested in modernization but entangled in collaboration with the 
Dutch.
12 See for an elaboration of this perspective: Henk Schulte Nordholt, "Onafhankelijkheid of moderniteit: 
Een geillustreerde hypothese," in Het koloniale beschavingsojfensief: Wegen naar het nieuwe Indie, 1890-1950, 
ed. Marieke Bloembergen and Remco Raben (Leiden, KITLV Uitgeverij, 2009), pp. 105-20. (An elaboration 
in English of Henk Schulte Nordholt's article will be published this year in the Journal o f Southeast Asian 
Studies.) For a notably broad and integral analysis of the multiple European, Chinese, and Indonesian 
initiatives that sought to further progress and associational life in colonial society, see: Kees van Dijk, The 
Netherlands Indies and the Great War, 1914 -^1918 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007).
13 The first standard works in this field are David Arnold, Police Power and Colonial Rule: Madras 1859-1947 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986); David Anderson and David Killingray, Policing the Empire: 
Government, Authority, and Control, 1830-1940 (Manchester and New York, NY: Manchester University 
Press, 1991). More recent works include Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, "Police and Public Order in Bombay, 
1880-1947," in Imperial Power and Popular Politics: Class, Resistance, and the State in India, c. 1850-1950 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 181-233; David Andrew Campion, "Watchmen of the 
Raj: The United Provinces Police, 1870-1931, and the Dilemmas of Colonial Policing in British India" (PhD 
dissertation, University of Virginia, 2002); Georgina Sinclair and Chris A. Williams, "'Home and Away': 
The Cross-fertilization between 'Colonial' and 'British' Policing, 1921-85," Journal of Imperial & 
Commonwealth History 35 (2007): 221-38. For a study of the political police and surveillance in the Dutch 
East Indies, see Harry A. Poeze, "Political Intelligence in the Netherlands-Indies," in The Late Colonial State 
in Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundations of the Netherlands Indies, 1880-1942, ed. Robert Cribb (Leiden: 
KITLV Press, 1994), pp. 229-46; Takashi Shiraishi, "Policing the Phantom Underground," Indonesia 63 
(April 1997): 1-46; Takashi Shiraishi, "The Origin of Modern Surveillance Politics in Indonesia," in 
Southeast Asia over Three Generations: Essays Presented to Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, ed. James T. Siegel and 
Audrey R. Kahin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2003), pp. 47-74; Elsbeth 
Locher-Scholten, "State Violence and the Police in Colonial Indonesia," in Roots of Violence in Indonesia: 
Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective, ed. Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (Leiden: KITLV 
Press, 2002), pp. 81-104; Marieke Bloembergen, "Koloniale Staat, Politiestaat? Politieke Politie en het Rode 
Fantoom in Nederlands-Indie, 1918-1927," Leidschrift 21 (2006): 69-90; Marieke Bloembergen,"The Dirty 
Work of Empire: Modern Policing and Public Order in Surabaya, 1911-1919," Indonesia 83 (April 2007): 
119-50; Marieke Bloembergen, De Geschiedenis van de Politie in Nederlands-Indie: Uit Zorg en Angst 
(Amsterdam, Leiden: Boom/KITLV Uitgeverij, 2009), chapter 7.
14 An important contribution to these studies, based on political police sources, was the publication of the 
reports of the political police: Harry A. Poeze, ed., Politiek-politioneele overzichten van Nederlandsch-Indie: 
Bronnenpublikatie, four volumes (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982-94).
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preoccupation with the Indonesian nationalist movement and anticolonial resistance, 
few historians have thought (or wanted to think) of subjecting the Indonesian, Dutch, 
and Eurasian authors of these reports—which are sometimes very well argued, 
sometimes one-sided, and always, necessarily, biased—to academic scrutiny that 
considers them by themselves.15 These police officers and the way they viewed the 
changes in colonial society, most notably in Sumatra's West Coast region in the 1930s, 
are the subject of this article. Roesad's experience will be the main example. The focus 
will be on exploring the ways in which writings like his illuminate the concepts of 
civilization, modernity, and political progress that circulated and functioned in the 
late-colonial state.
To assess the policemen's views of society and to get a further understanding of the 
colonial aspect of policing in the Dutch East Indies, we must first look at the 
organization of the police apparatus, and the way in which the concept of the "perfect 
policeman" was defined and applied, in practice, within this framework.
The Inherent Problems of the Colonial Police
The modern police in the Dutch East Indies, set up in the heyday of the "ethical 
policy" that held sway between 1900 and 1920,16 was meant to be the answer to a 
typical colonial problem: the struggle of a colonial state that wanted to be civilized, but 
witnessed its legitimacy crumbling. Compelled to use force to impose its authority, the 
state nonetheless sought to govern by consent. The police thus embodied the ethical 
policy's two contrary forces, simultaneous efforts to achieve development and control, 
as described in the standard work on this subject by the Dutch historian Elsbeth 
Locher-Scholten.17 Since the colonial police was the instrument used to pursue these 
diverse goals, it became a two-headed beast: in trying to safeguard the state's 
authority, it provoked resistance, while in reaching out to fulfill society's need for 
security, it required and sought the cooperation of the local population.18
A complicating factor was that the colonial police consisted mainly of Indonesians, 
who were expected to represent the colonial authorities. In the 1930s, when the police 
force of the Dutch East Indies peaked at 54,000 officers, around 52,000 police officers
15 For a critical analysis of political policing in the Dutch East-Indies, see Shiraishi, "Policing the Phantom 
Underground." It may be noted, moreover, that Ruth McVey emphasized that it was reading an English 
translation of a well-known colonial political report on the causes of the communist uprising on Sumatra's 
West Coast that had aroused her interest in "the way in which people digested their experience of social 
change [at the local level]." The translation she cited was: B. Schrieke, "The Causes and Effects of 
Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra," in Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings ofB.
Schrieke, ed. W. F. Wertheim, vol. I (Den Flaag/Bandung: VanFloeve, 1955), pp. 83-166 (originally written 
in 1928). In this context, she noted the social scientific aspects of colonial police reports. See Ruth 
McVey,"Schrieke's Westkust Rapport," in Aangeraakt door Insulinde. De Boeken van Drieentzvintig Lexers, ed. 
Peter Boomgaard, Harry A. Poeze, and Gerard Termorshuizen (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 1992), pp. 59-62.
16 This "ethical policy" (comparable to the idea of the "white man's burden"), officially launched in 1901, 
was the Dutch version of the mission civilisatrice with which European powers sought to invest their 
colonial policies with legitimacy.
Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, Ethiek in Eragmenten: Vijf Studies over Koloniaal Denken en Doen van Nederlanders 
in de Indonesische archipel, 1877 1942 (Utrecht: HES Publishers, 1981).
18 Compare Campion, "Watchmen of the Raj," pp. 1-2.
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were Indonesian.19 As stated above, most of these men occupied the lowest ranks, with 
senior positions—from that of inspector to chief commissioner—reserved almost 
entirely for Europeans or Eurasians. Only a few highly exceptional Indonesians were 
admitted to the senior ranks from the 1920s onwards. However, a few senior positions 
were specifically designated for members of the indigenous population, such as the 
mantri police (mantri politie) and wedana of police, which made it possible for more 
Indonesians to secure positions of authority within the force.
The Indonesian element within the colonial police exemplifies a key aspect of 
colonial state formation: the state's cooperation with the local population on which the 
colonial state depended. At the same time, the police force reflects a different aspect of 
the colonial state, by demonstrating how the racial hierarchy of its organization 
generated and consolidated ethnic distinctions.20 The colonial police force, therefore, 
provides a good picture of the colonial state's modus operandi and priorities.21 It was the 
police, more than any other instrument of power, that penetrated most deeply into the 
indigenous society and had the closest dealings with local people. More interestingly, 
perhaps, as the historians Rajnarayan Chandavarkar and Andrew Campion have 
argued for the British colonial police in India, is the way in which the police revealed 
the colonial state's weaknesses, ranging from its lack of legitimacy to the fragmentation 
of colonial authority.22 This certainly applied to the Dutch East Indies.2 The police was 
the face of the colonial state: it looked out, and the public looked right back at it. For a 
weak colonial state, eager to set the right "ethical" example, this close interaction 
heightened the need for a good police force, one that was not only effective but also 
professional and enlightened, authoritative but caring, an institution that promoted 
civilized values. That was the ideal of the modern colonial police. It remained an ideal, 
however, since, in practice, a different, violent side of the police was often in evidence, 
one that emphasized the brute force (and weakness) of the colonial state.24
Faithful to its stated mission of promoting development, the government of the 
Dutch East Indies greatly respected its own ideal concept of the police force, according 
to an official declaration read out in the representative assembly, the Volksraad, in 
August 1931, as "a service made up of men of superior principles, morals, and 
character."25 The police school founded in Sukabumi, central Java, in 1914—ten years 
before a similar central body was created in the Netherlands—both symbolized and 
promoted that ideal. The ideal was expressed, among other ways, through its central 
guidelines and rules concerning the use of force, which were issued to the new 
recruits, and which gradually took shape between 1920 and 1940, in the wake of three
19 Indisch Verslag I I 1933.
20 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, pp. 22-23.
21 Arnold, Police Power and Colonial Rule, p. 2.
22 Chandavarkar, "Police and Public Order in Bombay"; Campion, "Watchmen of the Raj," pp. 1-2.
23 Bloembergen, "Koloniale Staat, Politiestaat?" pp. 69-90; Bloembergen, "The Dirty Work of Empire," pp. 
119-50; Bloembergen, De Geschiedenis van de Politie in Nederlands-Indie, chapter 7.
24 On ideals of modern colonial policing and reality, see Bloembergen, De Geschiedenis van de Politie in 
Nederlands-Indie, chapters 6 and 8.
25 Government declaration read out to the Volksraad, August 16,1931, printed in the manual used by the 
police training school in the 1930s: P. Dekker and S. H. Tacoma, De Politie in Nederlandsch-Indie. Hare 
beknopte Geschiedenis, haar Taak, Bevoegdheid, Organisatie en Optreden, 2nd rev. ed. (Soekaboemi: 
Politieboekhandel, 1938).
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major reforms, in 1897, 1911-1914, and 1918-20. For instance, article 1 of the 
regulations of the police school mandated that every police officer, from the lowest to 
the most senior rank, must be conscious:
... that his conduct towards the public, regardless of a person's nationality, race, 
or social status, must be calm, civilized in word and deed, sympathetic but 
decisive where necessary; that the use of force, if not dictated by circumstances, is 
not permissible, and that all those who find themselves in the hands of the police, 
whether as an accused, a suspect, or witness, should feel assured of their safety 
and protection.26
This article was quoted in the manual used by the police training school in the 1930s, 
along with an indented and italicized summary: "The police exists to serve the 
public."27 As a sign of professionalization, four police associations—all founded by 
progressive police officers in the period 1916-20—propagated this ideal, partly 
through their respective trade journals. These organizations included Perserikatan 
Pegawai Politie Boemipoetera, or Inlandsche Politiebond, the native police association 
set up by and for Indonesian police officers, and the Vereeniging van Politie- 
Inspecteurs van Nederlandsch-Indie (Association of Dutch East Indies Police 
Inspectors). Members of the latter compared themselves, on the front page of their 
trade journal, De politie, to resolute Roman soldiers in armor, armed with swords and 
with the torches of enlightenment, who would bring peace, security, and civilization to 
the country.
Well-meaning descriptions and guidelines of this kind were obviously hard to 
reconcile with the task of imposing permanent political control, a task entrusted to the 
officers employed by the political criminal investigation department (in the cities) and 
to members of the district criminal investigation department, such as the wedana of 
police Roesad. These officers were given the conflicting responsibilities of law 
enforcement and social work, and the dilemmas inherent in this conflict became more 
pressing with the growing opposition to colonial rule in the 1930s. For indigenous 
political movements, but also for all kinds of other modern local groups, from mutual 
assistance societies to associations of bus drivers, the police acquired a more visible 
public presence, and, with the passage of time, the effectiveness of the police became 
the main benchmark for gauging the quality of colonial authority. This police force 
embodied "the dirty work of empire," in the memorable words of George Orwell, 
himself a former colonial police officer.28 It therefore became all the more important for 
the police to show its civilized face, to demonstrate the colonial state's goodwill to the 
population.
26 Dekker and Tacoma, De Politie in Nederlandsch-Indie, pp. 275-76.
27 Ibid., p. 276.
28 George Orwell, "Shooting an Elephant," in Otwell and Politics, ed. Peter Davison (London: Penguin 
Books, 2001), pp. 17-24. Originally published in 1936.
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De Politie, front page
All these tensions created an interesting relationship between the colonial police, 
concepts of civilization, and experiences of modernity in the colony: the police force 
was the product, vehicle, and watchdog of the drive for progress. For the modern 
police apparatus, which adopted the name of "general police force" (algemeene politie) 
in the 1920s and 1930s, it was perhaps the officers of the political police, acting as the 
product and guardians of modernity, who most clearly embodied these contradictory 
characteristics. They were led by the procurator-general and the central political 
intelligence service (Politieke Inlichtingendienst, PID) set up in 1916, renamed the 
General Criminal Investigation Service (Algemeene Recherchedienst, ARD) in 1918. 
They reported on the local population's fervent pergerakan, but they themselves were in 
the middle of it. Their reports went to local police chiefs—the senior Dutch officials of 
the internal administration department who were the first to assess intelligence—and, 
ultimately, to the procurator-general, who weighed up the evidence and translated his 
conclusions into policy and instructions for the political and regular police.29 Not only 
in the political police, but also in the general police force, the middle management and 
senior officials were mainly the products of modern police or administrative training,
29 On the organization, methods, and practices of the political police in the Dutch East Indies, see Poeze, 
"Political Intelligence"; Bloembergen, "Koloniale Staat, Politiestaat?"; and Bloembergen, Uit zorg en Angst, 
chapter 7.
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and were a mix of Europeans and Indonesians. All these young recruits—like Roesad 
and other political officials—wanted to get ahead. So they, too, favored progress—at 
least in the sense of promotion and personal advancement.
For many reasons, the colonial police is the perfect point of departure (following 
the ideas of the American historian Frederick Cooper) for a study of how ideas about 
modernity, progress, and civilization were experienced by different individuals and 
groups in colonial society itself.30 What does this institution teach us about the 
workings of the late-colonial state? Let us examine this question on a smaller scale, on 
the basis of the reports written by Roesad—the perfect policeman. In addition to 
performing his role as observer, Roesad was himself a product of the modernity he 
was paid to monitor. He avidly recorded what he saw of the "wave of civil unrest" that 
produced turmoil on Sumatra's West Coast between 1929 and 1933. How did he 
observe? What did he see? With what consequences? And how did this individual 
police officer deal with the contradictions between his intelligence-gathering duties 
and his support for progress?
The Perfect Policeman
In October 1934, the resident of Sumatra's West Coast, Van Heuven, warmly 
recommended his remarkable police officer Roesad to the director of Internal 
Administration (Binnenlands Bestuur). He wanted to honor Roesad, who had been 
working as wedana of police in the district criminal investigation department of 
Sumatra's West Coast since January 1929, by conferring on him the title of patih (the 
highest rank but one in the pangreh praja, Java's internal indigenous administration) in 
recognition of his special services on behalf of the colonial administration, his 
dedication, and loyalty. In particular, the resident extolled Roesad's remarkable 
intellect. The resident noted that, besides taking a keen interest in the diverse interests 
and trends within society, this political officer was capable of a high level of abstract 
analysis, and this was an ideal combination for a political observer, especially as it 
helped his superiors to formulate colonial policy in "this difficult district."31
Van Heuven had every reason to value capable observers in the political police. A 
few years earlier, on New Year's Day 1927, when Van Heuven's predecessor, G. F. E. 
Gonggrijp, was serving as resident, the authorities had been surprised by a wave of 
violent communist uprisings on Sumatra's west coast, less than a month after the 
police and army in Banten (Western Java) had suppressed a similar, unexpected revolt 
there. These events were clearly related. The colonial administration (and the colony's 
European population) had all reacted with a profound sense of shock, especially, 
perhaps, on Sumatra, where the rebels were found to be liberally supplied with 
firearms. Another disturbing feature was that while communism and religion were—in 
theory—mutually exclusive, these revolts had taken place in two districts populated by 
extremely devout Muslims.
30 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, p. 115.
31 ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3592, Resident Van Heuven to the director of the Internal Administration 
Department, October 19,1934.
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For the Dutch authorities in a region like Sumatra's West Coast, having a 
perspicacious and sharp-eyed officer like Roesad in the political police was a great 
boon and support. Resident Van Heuven went so far as to call Roesad's presence "a 
stroke of luck," not so much for Roesad's specific qualities as a police officer as for his 
capacity to "summarize his observations and place them in their social context."32 
According to Van Heuven, Roesad combined profound knowledge with a self- 
possessed demeanor and superb style of writing, providing razor-sharp, synthesizing 
analyses of the social and political changes that were rousing the indigenous 
population of West Sumatra to action. He was also capable of taking practical, 
vigorous measures when needed. "For Mr Roesad is no absent-minded theorist, he is 
concerned with reality; he seeks to participate in the events of the day and to have a 
positive impact on them to the best of his ability."33 All this was clear, he wrote, from 
the monthly political reports and special explanatory memoranda that Roesad had 
prepared for the administrative authorities, three of which he enclosed to prove his 
point. And should the director of Internal Administration require any further 
persuasion, senior government officials, such as the sociologist of law and former 
director of Education and Religious Affairs, B. J. O. Schrieke—who had led the official 
government enquiry into the causes of the communist revolt in Sumatra's West 
Coast—and the Arabist E. Gob6e, an advisor to the Internal Administration 
Department, would both gladly provide references for Roesad.34
Even today, anyone who reads Roesad's reports—about the religious and political 
movements of Sumatra's West Coast (1929), the education provided at local religious 
schools (1933), and the modernism in penghulu (Minangkabau adat leaders) circles 
(1933)—may well be entranced by Roesad's discussions of the apparent contradictions 
inherent in "modernity" in general, and the changes in Sumatra's West Coast region, in 
particular. These were the three pieces of "evidence," in the form of unpublished 
typescripts, that Van Heuven gave to the director of Internal Administration and that 
he also enclosed with his memorandum on leaving office (1934).35 As a result, Roesad 
was an important source of information for many later researchers on the socio­
political history of this region, whether directly or indirectly, as his observations were 
relayed through Van Heuven's postal reports and the memorandum he wrote on 
leaving office.36 Hendrik Bouman, a historian born in the Dutch East Indies, who wrote 
his PhD thesis at the University of Leiden during the Indonesian Revolution and 
struggle for independence, analyzing the development of the nationalist movement in 
Sumatra's West Coast, was one of the few scholars to pay tribute to Roesad in his 
treatise. Indeed, he quoted at length from "the excellent memorandum by Mr Roesad
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid. See for Schrieke's report: B. Schrieke, I let communisme ter Sumatra's Westkust (Batavia: 
Landsdrukkerij, 1928); Schrieke, "The Causes and Effects of Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra."
35 It should be noted, however, that a long passage from Roesad's "Nota over de godsdienstig-politieke 
beweging ter Sumatra's Westkust," of June 3,1929, was later reproduced as a political police source in R.
C. Kwantes, De ontunkkeling van de nationalistische beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie: Bronnenpublikatie. Derde 
stuk: 1928-Aug. 1933 (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff/Bouman'sBoekhuis, 1981), pp. 228-34.
36 Taufik Abdullah, Schools and Politics: The Kaum Mttda Movement in West Sumatra (1927-1933) (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971), pp. 35,128,194, 208, 255; Kahin, "Repression and Regroupment," 
pp. 40-44, 46; Audrey R. Kahin, Rebellion to Integration: West Sumatra and the Indonesian Polity (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 1999), pp. 54, 86.
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gelar Soetan Perpatih about 'The modernism in penghulu circles.'"37 So Van Heuven 
was certainly not the only person to set great store by Roesad's analyses. It is time to 
look at them in more detail.
"Springing Up Like Mushrooms"
Roesad's gaze focused on what he called "the wave of modern civil unrest"—a 
remarkable drive to achieve religious, political, and socio-economic progress, and a 
sudden zest for clubs and societies that had galvanized Minangkabau society since the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Partly in a professional capacity, but clearly driven 
by personal interest as well, he was particularly keen to examine the relationship 
between religion and politics. He himself belonged to the penghulu; he saw these 
developments with his own eyes and described his own experience. But he wrote 
about them in the language of the colonial rulers. Otherwise, how could he have 
chosen the phrase (used in Dutch exactly as it is in English) "springing up like 
mushrooms" to describe the modern religious schools and societies, political 
organizations, cooperative societies, and commercial and tolong-menolong (mutual 
assistance) associations?38
In his elegant study of cultural resilience in the Minangkabau, Jeffrey Hadler, while 
providing for a broad contextual analysis of schools, religion, adat, and the idea of 
progress (kemadjoean) among the Minangkabau, focuses mostly on explaining the rise 
of the critical, interrogative, and radical generation of Minangkabau intellectuals who 
thrived in the context of these special Minangkabau circumstances and who became 
famous for their role in the Indonesian Revolution and the formation of the early 
independent state. Because of this particular focus, Hadler overlooks the fact that 
equally critical and interrogative, but more clearly cooperative, persons such as Roesad 
were also the product of these circumstances.39 Born (in 1893) and bred in the 
Minangkabau region, Roesad, like many other Minangkabau intellectuals from his 
generation who are now more widely recognized, profited from the special dynamics 
of modernity in Minangkabau culture. These dynamics were created by a blend of 
colonial education politics, a lively, multiple modern schooling system, and an Islamic 
reform movement that, around 1900, interacted or were in opposition with the 
Minangkabau matriarchate and local adat. Coming from an elite family, Roesad 
attended the colonial teachers' training college at Fort de Kock (now Bukittinggi), 
known as the Sekolah Radja, where he became a schoolmate of Tan Malaka.40 This 
school, highly prestigious at the time, and described as a "uniquely modern
37 Hendrik Bouman, Enkele Beschouwingen over de Ontwikkeling van het Indonesisch Nationalisme op Sumatra's 
Westkust (Groningen/Batavia: Wolters, 1949), pp. 73-76.
38 ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3592, "Nota over de godsdienstig-politieke beweging ter Sumatra's Westkust," June 
3, 1929; and ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3592, "Het modernisme in penghoeloekringen," November 6, 1933, both by 
Roesad.
39 Hadler, Muslims and Matriarchs, pp. 10, 11, 87-112, 155, 180.
40 Gedenkboek samengesteld bij Gelegenheid van het 35 jarig Bestaan der Kweekschool voor Inlandsche Onderwijzers 
te Fort de Kock (Arnhem: Thieme, 1908).
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experience/' provided a secure base for a successful or lucrative colonial career, at least 
if the graduate wished for it.41
Roesad started his career in public service in 1912 as a teaching assistant at the 
Inlandse School der Eerste Klasse (First-Class Native School) in Padang. Between 1916 
and 1920, he rose from a position as clerk at the office of the local European 
administrator (controleur) of Pariaman, to assistant demang (head of district), with 
responsibility for administering the subdistrict of Padang Pandjang, and from there he 
went on to become demang in the districts of Bangkinan and Buo. He evidently 
attracted attention as a promising administrator, since in 1921 the colonial government 
urged him to study at the school of public administration in Batavia, after which he 
pursued his career as district head in Sawah Lunto. His role in the suppression of the 
communist uprisings made him known in that area as a severe colonial watchdog who 
dealt violently with opponents of Dutch colonial rule.42 It also earned him (along with 
a number of other police officers and administrative officials) a medal in the Order of 
Orange Nassau in July 1927 for his vigorous support and "unwavering loyalty to the 
authorities."43 It was in 1929 that Resident Gonggrijp appointed Roesad, whom he 
called "the intellectually most gifted officer in his force,"44 to the position in which 
capacity he was introduced above, that of wedana of the district criminal investigation 
department. Until then, Roesad's administrative duties had been confined to the level 
of subdivisions and districts; he now acquired high-level responsibility for policing the 
entire region. Over the years, his monthly salary had risen from the 25 guilders he 
earned in his first teaching job to 225 guilders.45
It was in the very first year of his appointment to the political police that Roesad 
started writing his idiosyncratic analyses of social change or "the wave of civil unrest" 
that he observed taking place in Minangkabau society. The subject had evidently 
fascinated him for a long time, since he had previously published a short piece about it 
in the journal of the Political Economic Federation of the Dutch East Indies 
(Nederlandsch-Indischen Politiek Ekonomischen Bond).46 In the present article, I will
41 Taufik Abdullah, Schools and Politics; on the Sekolah Radja, see Hadler, Muslims and Matriarchs, pp. 94- 
97.
42 Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, p. 48. Kahin also points to the ironic fact that Roesad's younger brother 
Dahlan was one of the major leaders in the communist uprising in Batavia in November 1926. Dahlan was 
later exiled to the internment camp in Digul.
43 National Archives, The Hague, Archives of the Ministry of Colonies, Geheim Archief (1901-1940), 
verbaal June 18,1927, V9, Decoraties 1927.
44 Gonggrijp on Roesad, as quoted by Resident Van Heuven in his letter to the director of the Internal 
Administration Department, October 19,1934, in ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3592.
45 This information on Roesad's career derives from ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3592, "Staat van dienst Mohamad 
Roesad gelar Soetan Perpatih"; and from a letter from Resident Van Heuven to the director of the Internal 
Administration Department, October 19,1934. See on Roesad also Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, pp. 84, 86, 
89,111-12; Mestika Zed, Edy Utama, and Hasril Chaniago ed., Sumatra Barat di Panggung Sejarah 1945- 
1995 (Padang: Bidang penerbitan khusus Panitia peringatan 50 tahun RI Sumatera Barat, 1995), pp. 22-23, 
38, 55. Concerning Roesad's salary in 1928, the salary of a beginning Indonesian police constable second 
class was twenty guilders, while an Indonesian detective of the criminal investigation department first class 
earned double that amount. A European chief police inspector (in rank parallel to a wedana of police) 
earned 450 guilders a month. ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3230.
46 Roesad, "Minangkabause Toestanden," Orgaan van den Nederlandsch-Indischen Politiek Ekonomischen Bond 
4 (1923): 587-590, 645-47.
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confine my discussion to the three memoranda mentioned above that so fired Van 
Heuven's enthusiasm.
Understandably—in view of the task entrusted to him—Roesad's focus in these 
reports was on the political significance of this "civil unrest." He concluded that this 
significance was inexorable, multifaceted, and related to local, national, and 
international developments. Roesad based these conclusions partly on his own 
observations and partly—as is the case in his second memorandum, dating from 
1933—on a thorough study of empirical sources. These sources included evidence 
collected in the course of police searches, from which he distilled conclusions on the 
changing religious attitudes and political views among students at the various 
religious schools in the area, since the evidence consisted of exercise books and 
dictated notes, class assignments, and answers to questions given in class. In addition, 
although Roesad's reports rarely referred to colonial ethnographic analyses (except for 
his own earlier writings), he did build on other people's ethnographies. One piece that 
influenced him, for instance, was a report on religious life in Sumatra's West Coast 
region by the Malay scholar and expert on adat law, P. S. van Ronkel.47 It is clear from 
Roesad's bibliographical references and terminology that his main indirect source of 
inspiration was Cornelis van Vollenhoven, professor of adat law at Leiden University. 
Van Vollenhoven was, indeed, the main direct source of inspiration for an entire 
generation of administrative officials, including Van Ronkel.
Partly trained and molded by the colonial system, Roesad saw the events around 
him from a colonial perspective.48 Although he was a Muslim, he appears to identify, 
in his reports, with a secular attitude of religious relativism, combined with colonial 
anxiety about active Islam, communism, and nationalism, and the possible 
relationships among them. At the same time, however, he sought to develop his own 
independent, critical ideas, and was fascinated by the problem posed by the 
combination of progress, religion, politics, and adat. And it was precisely in this area 
that so much was happening in the Minangkabau world to which he belonged and that 
he described in his reports.
The Minangkabau world was structured around the pillars of the Islamic religion 
and the matrilineal principles of adat (in which positions of power and property are 
passed down by inheritance through the maternal line). Precisely when Roesad was 
growing up, this world was in the throes of upheaval. Since the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, colonial intervention in the indigenous economy and the 
indigenous administration—an administration composed of adat leaders (penghulu) 
and religious leaders (ulama)—had become more and more marked. In addition, since 
around the beginning of the twentieth century, a drive for renewal within Islam had 
begun to take place, an adat movement that sought to adapt to the changes of the times. 
A rising urban middle class in the region (especially in Padang), whose members had 
attended Western-style secondary schools in Padang and Bukittinggi, was also 
inspired by notions of progress.49 Roesad came from the latter circles. In short, diverse
47 Ph. S. van Ronkel, Rapport betreffende de godsdienstige Verschijnselen ter Sumatra's Westkust (Batavia: 
Landsdrukkerij, 1916).
48 Cf. Robert Bickers, Empire Made Me: An Englishman Adrift in Shanghai (London: Penguin Books, 2004).
49 Taufik Abdullah, Schools and Politics; Hans van Miert, Een koel hoofd en een warm hart: Nationalisme, 
Javanisme en jeugdbeu>eging in Nederlands-Indie, 1918-1930 (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1995), p. 70.
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social groups were rising to the challenges of their times and would go on to found 
new schools and societies, working to achieve modernization or progress (kemadjuan).
In the period in which Roesad wrote his reports, there were two main schools of 
Islamic thought in the region, of which the modernizing "school" was the dominant 
force. This kaum muda (young generation) rejected the kaum kuno (old generation), 
proponents of a school of Islam that was regarded as traditional but that also had its 
roots in the early twentieth century. The kaum kuno consisted of the ulama and teachers 
(gurus) who had returned from the Middle East as haji, and the network of schools and 
mystical fraternities (tarekat) they had built up since the beginning of the twentieth 
century. The kaum muda rejected this mystical form of Islam and its dependence on 
traditional authority; instead, the members of this group advocated a return to, and the 
independent study of, the sources of Islam: the Koran and Hadith. This explains why 
Roesad refers to this innovative movement, in the first of the memoranda so admired 
by Van Heuven—on the religious movements of Sumatra's West Coast (1929)—as 
"orthodox Islam."50 In that essay, Roesad focuses on the work and influence of the 
religious intellectuals who represented the kaum muda movement. His chief concern is 
to define the political influence of this religious movement and its relationship to other 
religious organizations, such as Muhammadijah (set up in 1912), which started in Java 
but which had also acquired a following in Sumatra's West Coast since 1925. Roesad 
also kept a close eye on relations between religious intellectuals and the nationalist 
movement, which he described as being in an "embryonic state" in this region; in 
addition, he considered and wrote about the adat community.
The drive for renewal in Minangkabau society on which Roesad focused must be 
situated in the larger indigenous movement towards progress, the so-called pergerakan, 
that was so visible in colonial society from the early 1900s into the 1930s. One 
contemporary colonial observer, Judge W. Boekhoudt, in his 1908 report on behalf of 
the second large police reform to be instituted by the Dutch in Indonesia, referred to 
this visible drive for setting up clubs, theaters, associations, journals, and schools with 
the remarkably neutral phrase "stoot tot het meer opgewekt verenigingsleven" (drive for a 
more lively associational life).51 Takashi Shiraishi was one of the first postcolonial 
scholars to point to the broader, multifaceted nature of this pergerakan, which might 
include (or develop into) anticolonial political organizations, but was not restricted to 
anticolonial politics. Some scholars, who since the 1990s have focused on local 
expressions of this pergerakan and on local forms of popular radicalism, have tended to 
understand these phenomena more within a broader "universalizing" framework of 
progress and modernity, and less as a prelude to the anticolonial nationalist 
movement.52 Studies dealing with religious change and the modernization of Islam in 
Indonesia have also set this movement in a "universal" context by recognizing
50 ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3592, "Nota over de godsdienstig-politieke beweging ter Sumatra's Westkust," June 
3,1929. Compare how Michael Laffan problematizes the term "modernist" that historiography has more 
often used for kaum muda: Michael Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma below the 
Winds (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 7-8. On Kaum Muda, among many others: Taufik Abdullah, Schools 
and Politics, pp. 3-43; Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement; Van Miert, Een koel hoofd, pp. 69-72.
51W. Boekhoudt, Rapport Reorganisatie van het Politiewezen op Java en Madoera (uitgezonderd de Vorstenlanden, 
de particuliere Landerijen en de Hoofdplaatsen Batavia, Semarang en Soerabaia), 1906-07 (Batavia: 
Landsdrukkerij, 1908), p. 4.
52 Compare Hadler, Muslims and Matriarchs, p. 177.
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education as the motor for change.53 Recently, Hadler has offered the long-term 
perspective on the interactions between adat (local customs), religious change, and 
politics in Minangkabau society. It was precisely this relationship between religious 
modernization and education, local customs and radical politics, that interested 
Roesad as well; the difference is that Roesad was being influenced and formed by these 
dynamics himself.
Roesad's focus of interest—adat, religious change, and nationalist politics, and the 
interactions between these forces—thus also presages the main themes in the recent 
historiography on popular radicalism in Sumatra. Roesad discussed all these themes 
entirely in relation to the position and needs of his colonial masters. But in that sense 
the recent historiography hardly differs: for what it shares with Roesad, despite its 
other diverse aims, is, ultimately, an interest in the radical element, or political 
antagonism against the colonial state.
The Modern Religious Mind
In his first report, entitled "Nota over de godsdienstig-politieke beweging ter 
Sumatra's Westkust" (Memorandum on the religious/political movements of 
Sumatra's West Coast), Roesad explored the influence of orthodox intellectuals, or 
kaum muda, concluding that this influence was considerable on account of its 
organizational success, its many schools and societies, and the quality of the education 
with which it was associated. Roesad saw the independent study of primary Islamic 
sources as the most important feature of this education: "The depth of this education 
may be appreciated once it is understood that it completely breaks with the old custom 
of placing all one's reliance in the explanations provided by teachers." A curriculum 
based on this principle was more likely to mold critical minds, according to the author. 
That is why Roesad believed that this religious intellectual training was politically 
significant as a force that was influencing the Minangkabau matrilineal society and 
potentially posed a threat to Dutch colonial rule.
In short, Roesad posited a logical connection between what he called the modern 
"religious mind" (or godsdienstig intellect) and nationalism. What is more, he held that 
the dynamic relationship between religious and political developments in Sumatra was 
reinforced by colonial domination in itself, and by the reactions to this state of being by 
the indigenous residents, whose religion was completely different from that of the 
Dutch.
Nationalism develops along with the mind. This is seen everywhere, also in 
minds molded by modern Western education. There too, nationalism can easily 
creep in. It starts by manifesting itself in the will to reform one's own society, 
then comes the demand to participate in decision-making, and finally, in colonial 
territories, a desire to regain power.54
53 Taufik Abdullah, Schools and Politics; Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement.
54 ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3592, "Nota over de godsdienstig-politieke beweging ter Sumatra's Westkust," June 
3, 1929.
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Roesad also claimed that nationalism was a consequence of religious intellectual 
training. The critical religious education provided by the kaum muda also explained, in 
Roesad's view, the influence of the "religious mind" within the communist movement, 
and hence, indirectly, it helped explain the uprising in Sumatra's West Coast region at 
the beginning of 1927.
Roesad illustrated the thoroughness and modernity of the kaum muda's 
organizational structure by describing the system it had set up for training teachers 
and students, as well as the societies, such as Sumatra Thawalib, that students 
themselves had established in various places since 1918 (which he described as similar 
to general student societies), and the kaum muda's schools, which were organized along 
modern lines. The new, "orthodox" religious education had broken decisively with the 
old system of the kaum kuno, in which, as Roesad described, haji wanting to give 
religious instruction had to start by begging from door to door to support themselves, 
after which they were educated by older religious mentors. In the new system, parents 
had to pay school fees. Most of the students who enrolled at the Thawalib schools had 
already completed primary education and came from affluent families. Roesad noted 
that these students now tended to go around in what he called "smart attire" {netjes 
gekleed): in other words, "wearing ties and long trousers, shoes, and spectacles, just like 
students at a Western-style college."55
The courses set up by Minangkabau religious intellectuals in the early 1920s had 
grown into fully fledged schools, with former students now serving as teachers. The 
most important of these institutions were in Padang Pandjang, Parabek, and Padang 
Djopang, which served approximately 800, 1,000, and 600 students, respectively, from 
all parts of Sumatra, "who would go on to disseminate the Thawalib's ideals," wrote 
Roesad. At the initiative of the students of the school of Padang Pandjang, members of 
the local Thawalib had formed their own society, consolidating its organizational 
structure during two conferences in November 1928 and May 1929, electing an 
executive committee, and launching their own periodical, Perdamaian (Peace), to be 
published every ten days. According to Roesad, the Thawalib students were now 
among the most influential intellectuals in the popular movement in the West Coast of 
Sumatra. Their goal was to reform society "on the basis of orthodox Mohammedan 
principles." This they planned to achieve, he went on, by following three lines of 
strategy. The first, the struggle against the "irreligious customs" of the kaum kuno, the 
tarekat doctrine, and adat religious offices, was already largely won; the second, the 
struggle against the matrilineal society, still had a long way to go; but the primary 
emphasis was on the third struggle, against colonial domination, fueled in part by a 
powerful revival of nationalist sentiments.
Roesad had been struck by the vehemence of the nationalism expressed at the 
Thawalib conference in May 1929. The nationalist passion took many forms: criticism 
of the colonial administration; the decision to change the name "Sumatra-Thawalib" 
into "Indonesia-Thawalib"; the adoption of a special Thawalib song; and the 
introduction of public holidays to commemorate the anniversaries of the deaths of
55 Ibid. For a discussion of shoes, and modern clothing generally, as aspects of modern ideals in the Dutch 
East Indies, sometimes experienced as provocative, see Henk Schulte Nordholt, "Introduction," in 
Outward Appearances: Dressing State and Society in Indonesia, ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt (Leiden: KITLV 
Press, 1997), pp. 1-38. See also Laffan, Islamic Nationhood, pp. 8,171-72.
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national heroes, such as Diponegoro. In all these decisions, held Roesad, there 
resonated "the belief in a Great Indonesia that was being propagated on Java, the aim 
being to create the free country of 'Indonesia.'" He saw the Thawalib's new 
educational plans, which were designed to create more unified standards and 
curricula, as significant to the movement's political aims, as he perceived them. Classes 
would no longer be confined to religious instruction based on orthodox principles; 
they would be expanded to include economics, politics, agriculture, bookkeeping, 
knowledge of the law, and so forth.56
Roesad expected the growing trend towards nationalism to tip the balance among 
the kaum muda in favor of the struggle of the "religious mind" against colonial 
domination, rather than to concentrate on efforts to "purge society of customs deemed 
to be irreligious according to the kaum muda doctrine." He applied similar predictions 
to the Javanese society Muhammadijah, which, like the Thawalib, focused on studying 
the sources of Islam. Roesad pointed out that, in Java, Muhammadijah was 
emphatically apolitical and social in its aims, but that the Sumatran branch of the 
organization had adapted to a different context. In the West Coast region of Sumatra, 
where it acquired a following from the mid-1920s onwards, Muhammadijah concerned 
itself with political issues, wrote Roesad, as it operated under the auspices of the 
Thawalib and their schools.
When it came to the potential of the nationalist movement based on non-religious 
principles, Roesad was fairly dismissive. Aside from members of trade unions, "those 
who had been educated along Western lines" had not organized themselves into any 
force in this area. He explained this omission by pointing out that most Minangkabau 
who had enjoyed a Western education worked either for the colonial government or 
for private companies, which gave them no freedom of movement to organize or to put 
themselves forward as leaders. Furthermore, there was as yet little mutual 
understanding between those whose minds had been formed by religious education 
and those who had attended Western-style schools. However, he expected that this, 
too, was bound to change.
Modern Religion and Political Conscience
Four years later, in October 1933, Roesad produced a memorandum on education 
and religious schools, "Rapport over het onderwijs aan godsdienstscholen, in verband 
met de ontdekkingen tijdens de huiszoekingen in September 1933" (Report on 
education at Religious Schools, in connection to the police searches in September 1933), 
in which he concluded that his predictions had been borne out. Building on the 
analysis he had outlined in 1929, he expanded in this memorandum on the relationship 
between modern religious education and politics. Although Roesad was much more 
straightforward in focusing on the radical element, his conclusions on the development 
of the youthful critical mind are comparable to those drawn recently by Hadler. In his 
book, Hadler looks at the broader context and the multiplicity of schooling in West 
Sumatra, but, like Roesad, sees the questioning and sceptical generation of 
Minangkabau men and women as one of the unintended effects of modern education.
56 ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3592, "Nota over de godsdienstig-politieke beweging ter Sumatra's Westkust," June 
3,1929.
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Interestingly enough, the research methods of Hadler and Roesad show a remarkable 
similarity, as well. Both drew their insights about the development of the critical, 
youthful mind partly from a special source: school materials, including classroom 
assignments and students' notes. It is true that the sources Hadler and Roesad cite are 
not entirely from the same period, and that they gathered their empirical data in 
different ways, through thorough archival research (Hadler) and by police coercion 
(Roesad).57 Yet these differences in method, questions, and framework did not lead to 
very different interpretations of these sources with regard to the development of the 
self-conscious, critical mind. It may be, however, that Roesad came closer to getting a 
grip on how the mind could radicalize, in part because he was conducting a 
straightforward search for the politicized elements in modern education.
Modernist Islamic education, Roesad explained, insisted on self-examination. It 
allowed scope for freedom of thought and introduced students to critical Arab authors. 
The "inspired modern Islamic views" of these writers opened young readers' eyes to 
trends and problems in their own society, and encouraged them to think of 
explanations and solutions. Roesad was struck by the fact that, in this modern religious 
education, texts from the Koran were explained using examples taken from present- 
day society, and vice versa. From here, he reasoned, it was a small step to examining 
political principles and problems in the light of Islamic doctrine, so that "the 
explanation of God's words moves into the sphere of politics."58
In the mid-1930s, the Thawalib had reorganized under the new name of Persatuan 
Muslim Indonesia, the Indonesian Muslims' Union, known as Permi. After its first two 
years, Roesad claimed, it had emerged as an openly radical political party, "fighting for 
the freedom of the East Indies." The Permi demanded more say in the management 
and government of the Thawalib schools. Most Thawalib schools affiliated themselves 
with the new movement, while some branches of the Permi set up schools of their own, 
including a number for girls. But the Permi had also provoked opposition from the 
heads of certain Thawalib schools who wanted to retain their independence, such as 
haji Ibrahim Moeso, from Parabok, and haji Abbas, from Padang Pandjang. Haji Abbas 
changed his school's name to "Darulfunun Abbasijah" (House of Multiple Sciences), 
while Moeso banned "all political carryings-on" in the vicinity of his school. Roesad 
argued that, in spite of these divergences, the schools were still relevant to his 
discussion since both continued to be run according to modernist religious principles.
Roesad's lengthy second memorandum was prompted by police searches 
conducted in August 1933, including one at the Permi teachers' training college for 
girls, in Fort de Kock, that had yielded evidence for the politicization of education.59 A 
wider-ranging police investigation followed in September, encompassing other schools 
that were based on modernist religious principles, ostensibly to search for copies of the 
proscribed book Mentjapai Indonesia Merdeka (The Path to a Free Indonesia), by 
Soekarno. In fact, the real aim of the search, according to Roesad, was to find more 
material that would help the authorities assess the nature of the education being
57 Hadler, Muslims and Matriarchs, pp. 105-11.
58 ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3592, "Rapport over het onderwijs aan godsdienstscholen, in verband met de 
ontdekkingen tijdens de huiszoekingen in September 1933," October 18,1933.
59 Ibid.
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provided. These searches yielded indisputable evidence, he wrote, of "the political 
nature [of the education] and the political contamination of the students" in these 
schools. According to Roesad, aside from "normal educational textbooks of all kinds," 
the police also found a large quantity of "radical nationalist" treatises, such as the 
writings of Mohammed Hatta and Soekarno, and pamphlets distributed by the Partai 
Nasional Indonesia and Perhimpunan Peladjar-Peladjar Indonesia, as well as various 
magazines and periodicals, such as Persatuan Indonesia (The Unity of Indonesia) and 
Medan Ra'jat (Arena for the People). It was found that many students had taken out 
collective subscriptions to periodicals and pamphlets and took turns reading them. 
Furthermore, the police had found notes in the exercise books of "almost every 
student" relating to classes given by various societies, some political and some not, 
mixed in with the dictated notes they had written at school. Further enquiries revealed 
that these classes had been taught outside school. Finally, the police discovered 
exercise books with notes from political publications, from which "certain passages, 
salient sentences, and in some cases entire articles had been copied out," wrote Roesad.
This harvest of confiscated exercise books and notebooks clearly reflects the 
intrusive actions of the colonial state, which in this case displays features of a police 
state. But the political writings also reflect the enthusiasm and zest for learning with 
which the students at these besieged schools set about absorbing new knowledge, 
political and otherwise. Roesad found all this confiscated material to be a unique 
source of information that illuminated the religious and political consciousness of the 
Minangkabau youth, and he quoted at length from this bizarre source material in his 
second memorandum.
At this juncture, Roesad considered the relationship between modernist religious 
education and politics to be a matter of "potential," rather than a logical necessity. He 
noted that education could not be labeled "politicized" everywhere in the region, and 
wrote that the "direct" political influence of students generally took place outside 
schools. He did believe that regular education played a role in this politicization, in 
that it fostered a desire for social reform among young people. But he also believed 
that this desire called for the development of "secular knowledge," which was not 
provided by the one-sided religious educational model. As a result, "young hearts" 
listened eagerly to propaganda provided outside school, which could satisfy their urge 
for action. In addition, the largely theoretical and primarily religious education 
provided at some schools did not provide any framework for, or satisfy the need for, 
what he called "all-round thinking" and the freedom to undertake general research, 
"so that students are then compelled to look elsewhere," remarked Roesad—perhaps 
in a moment of self-reflection.
Roesad discussed the schools and the education they provided one by one, on the 
basis of the evidence that the police had confiscated from them. In this discussion, he 
combined his role of political police officer with that of a sometimes rather pedantic 
school inspector. He started by looking at what the confiscated material revealed about 
groups and organizations before turning to its content. I shall confine myself here to a 
few examples. Roesad gave short shrift to the Darulfunan Abbasijah run by haji Abbas. 
He was not impressed by the education it provided. Though not politicized, it was of a 
poor quality, he said. The classes presented a dismal picture of the way in which haji 
Abbas evidently conceived his duties in providing religious instruction. "All the
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exercise books are messy, the work they contain appears to have been seldom, if ever, 
checked; there is no proof that the work was ever corrected." The students attended 
school for only a few hours a day, "leaving them ample time to organize political 
courses and to carry out propagandist activities in the houses in the vicinity of the 
school," where they boarded. "The devil finds work for idle hands," Roesad 
concluded, ignoring the fact that the modernist religious education encouraged 
students to act independently.
On the other hand, Roesad attached considerable significance to the oldest 
Thawalib school, in Padang Pandjang, describing it as an institution that had been 
closely linked to the political development and history of this district throughout the 
fifty years of its existence. It had been the breeding ground for the first Thawalib 
organization in 1918. The school's past and present students reorganized the society at 
the first Thawalib conference of 1928, and politicized youth organizations, such as the 
Persatuan Murid Djinah schools, the Himpunan Pemuda Islam, and the "El hilaal" 
scouting club, were all to be found near this school. The youth organizations of the 
PSII, PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Party), and Partindo (Partai 
Indonesia, Indonesian Party) also recruited members here. About 30 percent of the 
school's 450 students in 1933 were attached to existing political parties, most to Permi. 
And since those who were still minors joined youth organizations and debating clubs, 
Roesad concluded that 60 to 70 percent of the students were "politically contaminated 
to a greater or lesser extent." Although members of the school board did not exert any 
influence within the school, they influenced students directly by dealing with political 
subjects in courses taught outside the school.
The curriculum at the school in Padang Pandjang consisted of history, exegesis of 
the Koran, lessons in patriotism, and social studies or psychology (in Roesad's spelling, 
tarich, tafsir, tarbijatoelawathaniah, and Ilmoe Nafsa, respectively). Roesad concluded from 
the students' notes that these classes had provided broad outlines of the topics under 
consideration. In social studies, for instance, students had been taught about the rights 
and obligations of the individual human being vis-^-vis society, "as appropriate in a 
well-ordered state." Such discussions might provoke comparisons with the students' 
contemporary context, Roesad suggested, thus rousing and fueling political 
sentiments. However, in some notebooks he found evidence of teachers wielding 
"personal political influence" over their charges. He gave an example, translating some 
notes (from Arabic to Malay) written by students in the seventh grade, referring to 
freedom (as ordained by "the Lord"60), revolution, and the struggle against colonial 
rule. Essays about "the mother country"—about a free and harmonious Indonesia, 
ordained by God, to be achieved through unremitting perfection (kesempoernaan) and 
struggle—provided, in his view, clear illustrations of the students' "fanaticism." 
Roesad also saw the teachers' corrections and grading of students' work as revealing:
The phrasing of the teachers' dictated notes, their approving comments on 
students' essays, which constantly included remarks that have no place at a 
school that aims purely to provide an education, imbued the lessons with a 
political flavor, and therefore interacted with political influences outside school 
and encouraged them.
60 Roesad's translation uses the word toeim (the Lord) rather than "Allah.
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At the teachers' training college for girls and the Sanawijah school in Fort de Kock, 
where the police had conducted their first searches, much the same picture emerged. 
Both were Permi organizations, and were led by haji Muchtar Lutfi, a fact that Roesad 
said assured the schools' political orientation. At the second Permi conference in 
October 1931, Lutfi's lecture "Manoesia dengan Islam dan Kebangsaan serta 
Persatoean dalam Islam" (Islamists, Nationalists, and Unity in Islam) was adopted as 
the basis for the decision to incorporate political education in Permi's program, "in 
preparation for participation in political life." Roesad wrote that the two schools 
mentioned above should be judged in the light of that decision. They shared the same 
curriculum and the same teachers. The staff of the girls' school also included women 
members of the Permi chief executive who had recently been arrested: Rasuna Said 
and Rasimah Ismail. Roesad listed the percentage of the eighty-seven female students 
who belonged to "politicized" organizations. For these schools, too, he plowed through 
the exercise books, which, together with the propaganda material collected on August 
18 and September 7, provided "irrefutable" evidence of the "profound contamination" 
of girls and boys at these two schools. Just as telling, in his view, were assignments 
handed out by teachers: students were required to explain a Koran text about kafir 
(infidel), to write about the lessons conveyed by the freeing of slaves according to 
Islam, to list the characteristics of "society" and "a leader," and to explain how "unity" 
should be achieved. The teachers' corrections and the grades they assigned were 
equally significant, according to Roesad.
The most noteworthy difference that emerged from Roesad's comparison of all 
these exercise books was that the girl students kept their papers in far better order. 
This may appear to be a superficial observation, but Roesad saw it as politically 
significant:
The political notes and courses, as well as the passages quoted from political 
publications, are arranged more systematically and written out more neatly ... 
than elsewhere, something that not only testifies to dedication and meticulous 
care, but also to the seriousness with which the [girls] followed and absorbed this 
political information, which must reflect their education.
This observation reflected the main conclusion arising from Roesad's analyses in this 
memorandum, which could be summarized as: "the modernist education system and 
its social context lead to 'political education' in the true sense of the term." But as a 
theory on gender, dedication, neatness, and radicalization, it may be more meaningful 
than that, for it complements Hadler's refined analysis of the public role of women in 
the Minangkabau progressive movement and suggests a path for further research into 
the role of young Minangkabau women in popular radicalism.61
Of the three memoranda written by Roesad, this second one had the most far- 
reaching repercussions. The police investigation that had preceded it had already led 
to the arrest of several men and women in Permi's senior ranks. What is more, 
Resident Van Heuven decided to ban all meetings of the Permi and PSII following the 
report. This ban ushered in a period of strict control and enforcement by the political
61 Compare with Hadler, Muslims and Matriarchs, pp. 129,156-63,170.
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police, as a result of which politically active young men and women in this area found 
new channels and more diffuse ways of expressing their views.62
Modernism in Penghulu Circles
Up to this point, Roesad had focused primarily on the effects of the kaum muda 
movement. But he realized all too well that modern ways of thinking were not 
exclusive to this group. In his third and final memorandum, "Het modernisme in 
penghoeloekringen,"63 produced in November 1933, he therefore focused on an almost 
classic anthropological question, which was, at the same time, an important colonial 
political question: how did the kaum kuno, the adat leaders (representing "local 
tradition"), respond to the changes taking place around them?64 Since he was himself a 
penghulu, Roesad could speak from experience here. "No one could expect chiefs [adat 
leaders] to remain unmoved by the wave of civil unrest," wrote Roesad, thus voicing 
one of the colonial administration's major concerns. For these leaders themselves 
belonged to that potentially volatile population, he argued. "Every change in the 
population's socio-economic and political ideas must undoubtedly be reflected in 
penghulu circles, which influences the ideas of the chiefs, and not least their position." 
Roesad's central proposition was that the attitudes of the adat chiefs to the surrounding 
struggle for progress were determined by the question of "whether these had a 
beneficial or adverse effect on their own positions, a question that was often viewed 
from the vantage point of self-interest."
After offering a brief outline of the formal position of the adat chiefs (under both 
private and constitutional law) in Minangkabau society, as custodians of matrilineal 
inheritance law and leaders of the administrative and legal bodies within a community 
or nagari,65 Roesad emphasized that this society, based on the principles of adat, was 
never static, but rather was constantly developing. For instance, it had assimilated the 
influences of the colonial money economy and the revival of Islam in its own 
idiosyncratic way (Roesad left the administrative interventions of the colonial 
authorities out of consideration). An important instrument of social change was the 
consultative system known as mufakat, "which opens that way to compromise, even 
with ideas that are diametrically opposed to its own principles." The mufakat 
consultations eventually had the effect, in the 1920s, of making adat leaders more 
tolerant of and mildly disposed to modernist Islam—which wanted to purge local 
Islam of "irreligious" customs, such as the festivities held at the beginning of the 
sugarbeet harvest and certain funeral customs—and the leaders themselves helped to 
promote the local religious schools.
In the cases of various shared-interest groups, matters were rather more complex, 
said Roesad. In principle, the modern organizational structure of a political interest 
group clashed with traditional adat organizations, which Roesad described as groups 
based on communal family relationships and led by adat chiefs. "Because of the system
62 Kahin, "Repression and Regroupment."
63 ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3592, "Het modernisme in penghoeloekringen," November 6,1933.
64 Ibid.
65 Nagari denotes a basic territorial unit in the Minangkabau.
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of administration and leadership, on the one hand, and individual members who are 
under an obligation of organizational obedience to this administration and leadership, 
on the other, the existence of shared-interest groups is bringing about a shift of 
influence from adat chiefs to these societies' leaders." Nonetheless, the adat leaders had 
supported a wide variety of associations, such as those set up for economic and social 
purposes, cooperative societies, and commercial and tolong-menolong associations, 
which, as noted earlier, Roesad described as having "sprung up like mushrooms." 
Some adat leaders joined these associations, or even put themselves forward to lead 
them, to serve their own "personal interests." Some acted out of dissatisfaction with 
other colleagues or nagari heads, and therefore wanted to "assure themselves of the 
necessary votes in elections to the latter office." Whatever the case might be, stated 
Roesad, modern clubs and associations had encountered little opposition from 
Minangkabau adat leaders.
The penghulu saw few problems with the groups that revolved around local or 
socio-economic interests; it was the political groups, in particular the "disciplined 
organizations," that were not confined to a specific nagari, that worried adat heads— 
and the police officer Roesad. These political groups were disrupting the social order, 
both through their manner of organization and their political slogans. Where 
organizational structure was concerned, local members were responsible only to the 
higher ranks in their respective associations (which were unrelated to the nagari), the 
groups set up modern offices and chose the premises for their clubs without consulting 
adat leaders, and the groups' members were difficult to monitor since outsiders more 
easily traveled into and out of the nagari, thanks to modern means of transport. The 
rallying cry for freedom that inspired members of such groups was accompanied by 
criticism of the existing social order and its custodians, the adat leaders. The adat 
leaders' authority declined, as a result, and they commanded less respect. Roesad 
added that, as these political organizations proliferated, adat leaders had been 
compelled—by a colonial administrative decision dating from 1919—to adopt the role 
of observers.
At this point in his memorandum, Roesad inserted the relevant decision himself: 
Indisch Staatsblad 1919 no. 27, which the Dutch authorities had promulgated in an 
earlier period of turbulence for the colonial state. This decision, according to Roesad's 
summary, placed the supervision of political developments in the hands of the head of 
the local administration (the resident), acting in concert with his officials (including 
European and indigenous police officers, such as Roesad). Roesad argued that this 
decision had doubly undermined the authority of adat leaders: they could no longer 
take independent political action, and, with the advent of countless rival groups 
involved in promoting social progress, their subjects increasingly came to feel that 
these old adat leaders were "irrelevant." This belief, in turn, made the people even 
more susceptible to political propaganda; and the penghulu, having lost their old self- 
assurance, simply allowed the "rapid and destructive political developments of recent 
times" to run rampant—before their eyes, but outside their sphere of action and 
authority. The power of the penghulu had drained away.
With this analysis, Roesad was speaking the language of conservative politicians, 
who would seek to restore "traditional centers of authority" over the following few 
years by setting up local councils to promote law and order.
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Roesad and the Limits of Progress
As befits a modem professional police force, the perfect police officer in the Dutch 
East Indies was (ideally) civilized at all times and strong when necessary. From the 
perspective of the colonial state, Roesad certainly fulfilled both of these criteria. But he 
surpassed the basic requirements, as Resident Van Heuven agreed, for he was also a 
gifted intellectual who had received a modern education and who took a keen interest 
in the processes of social change going on around him. While it is true that Roesad's 
memoranda were clearly inspired by his job as a police officer, which required him to 
monitor political trends, they were more interesting than most reports written by 
political police officers, which merely registered observations. Roesad not only went in 
search of evidence of political activity, but he also tried to highlight relationships— 
between religious and political trends, the old and the new, the general and the specific 
—and to find explanations for the phenomena he observed. This was a way of looking 
that went beyond the recognition of political doctrines, organizations, and connections, 
the things that all political police officers were trained to notice.66 *In many respects, 
Roesad was a remarkable man.
All this means that Roesad's reports are interesting not only because of his analyses 
of the cultural politics of a Minangkabau world that was in the throes of turbulent 
change, but also because he proved to have developed a remarkable sensitivity to the 
field of tension between modern trends and the colonial ethos. He had a good nose for 
new trends—in matters of religion, dress, social interaction, or education—and, in a 
sense, he might be regarded as a political chronicler of modern times. He saw the "anti- 
Western feeling" that he discerned in the active life of Minangkabau clubs and societies 
as something that was "inherent... to colonial domination.Insightfully, he linked the 
enthusiasm of the locals for forming new organizations and clubs for joint activities— 
which he was expected to observe—to a spirit of individualism, "independent 
thought," and "self-examination," all aspects of modernity that he judged to be equally 
important and related: "A club is the product of the trend towards individualism, in 
which people with a similar education, with similar beliefs and interests, come 
together to pursue a shared purpose," wrote Roesad.68 What is also striking, at times, is 
Roesad's empathy and ability to put things in perspective—even while he remains 
bound by his policeman's terms of reference—in his analyses of the intellectual efforts 
of the kaum muda, teachers and students, and penghulu attitudes to modernism. 
Commenting on the one-sided history lessons offered at the Thawalib religious school 
in Padang Pandjang—lessons that focused on the history of Islam, related in terms of 
the struggle against the Christians in the past (during the Crusades) and present (in 
territories under Western rule in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt)—he did not see these as
66 See Shiraishi, "Policing the Phantom Underground"; and Bloembergen, Uit ~org en Angst, chapter 7.
ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3592, "Rapport over het onderwijs aan godsdienstscholen, in verband met de 
ontdekkingen tijdens de huiszoekingen in September 1933," October 18,1933.
"s ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3592, "Het modernisme in penghoeloekringen," November 6,1933.
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curious, but as "a defect or vice inherent in all religions, to view all other faiths in an 
unfavorable light."69
With his ample gaze and his interest in the general modernist trends in society, 
Roesad appears to have adopted a more inclusive view of modernity than did many 
later researchers, who focused one-sidedly on anticolonialism and the political efforts 
of the kaum muda movement and Indonesian nationalism. In Roesad's view, the efforts 
of the kaum kuno to influence and mold the changes taking place around them were 
also manifestations of the drive for progress and modernity.
Notwithstanding his sharp mind, frank curiosity, and sometimes empathic 
observations of the local drive to achieve emancipation, Roesad ultimately contributed 
actively to the colonial repression of local aspirations. If we judge from the article he 
had previously published in the journal of the Political Economic Federation, it seems 
unlikely that this responsibility kept him awake at night.70 The above analyses show 
that, while he supported change, he favored change that was harmonious and gradual. 
And, after all, political peace and stability were in his interest, too. On the other hand, 
he had often told his grateful superior, Van Heuven, that he was actually eager to leave 
the political criminal investigation department for a more intellectually satisfying job. 
That may have been a sign that his conscience troubled him, or that he felt uneasy 
about his position. His career was, in fact, fraught with difficulties.
This discussion of Roesad opened by noting the tribute paid to him by Resident 
Van Heuven, conferring on him the title of patih, in recognition of his remarkable 
intellectual efforts and loyalty. While Roesad had long made it known that he was 
hoping for a transfer—to some more intellectually challenging position outside the 
police force—Van Heuven did not want to lose him. That was another reason why Van 
Heuven was eager to place his valued officer in the limelight. Van Heuven also 
thought that he understood why Roesad wanted to satisfy his intellectual thirst 
elsewhere. After all, one could not expect "native employees, however sincere [reeel] 
and loyal their attitudes might be," ultimately to take personal pleasure in a job that 
"could discredit them and make them suspect in the eyes of their own society," a 
dilemma that would not affect a transient European official so forcefully. At the same 
time, Van Heuven realized that Roesad had become the victim of his "exceptional 
aptitude and value" to the district authorities, since they were reluctant to let him go. 
So this, in itself, made Van Heuven feel uneasy, and it explains why he had for some 
time felt that he needed to provide some "compensation" for the indispensable Roesad, 
to sweeten the pill represented by his demanding job.71
But Van Heuven had another argument for providing this compensation. The new 
title would give Roesad more prestige and make him more unassailable within the 
district criminal investigation department, and the resident had "pragmatic" reasons 
for believing this to be necessary. Van Heuven had noticed that the European officers 
in that department were sometimes envious of Roesad, "who was in many cases
69 ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3592, "Rapport over het onderwijs aan godsdienstscholen, in verband met de 
ontdekkingen tijdens de huiszoekingen in September 1933," October 18,1933.
70 Roesad, "Minangkabause Toestanden."
71 ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3592, Resident Van Heuven to the director of the Internal Administration 
Department, October 19,1934.
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superior to them in terms of his knowledge of Minangkabau matters ... and personal 
aptitude." These officers could not resist the temptation to treat Roesad in a way "the 
effect of which may be equated with difficulties that have a deleterious impact on the 
progress of the work," observed Van Heuven, who (unlike Roesad) was not known for 
his elegant prose style. In short, Roesad earned his title three times over. Viewed 
differently, the tribute was an imperfect attempt to compensate for the sometimes 
complex racial relationships that predominated both in colonial society and within the 
civil service. Roesad, who was over qualified for his position as a police officer, came 
off badly in both these environments. He operated within a framework of cooperation 
and mutual dependency, but also one in which he suffered from obvious 
discrimination.
The irony does not end here. The police branch of the department of Internal 
Administration had to deliberate about Van Heuven's proposal. To them, it seemed 
fraught with problems. To start with, patih was a Javanese rank, which was out of place 
in Minangkabau society. It was also unknown within the police force. However, the 
police did have and use a number of lower Javanese titles, as was apparent from 
Roesad's own position. Furthermore, the administrators were forced to concede that 
colonial policy was not very consistent on this point, since another Minangkabau 
official with the rank of patih was employed by the ARD. An alternative would be to 
give Roesad the rank of police commissioner, but this might arouse undue expectations 
for further promotions later in his career and cause consternation among other 
commissioners. The officials ended up proposing a compromise: Roesad would 
acquire not the rank, but the personal title, of patih. This formula, they hoped, would 
express their appreciation while averting confusion.72 In reality, this fudge showed the 
extent to which the colonial bureaucracy had become entwined in its own hierarchy of 
ranks and titles. And, once again, it was Roesad who came off worst.
The how and why of Roesad's subsequent career would repay further research; it is 
beyond the scope of this article to follow Roesad's responses to the development of 
colonial policies and the efforts of the indigenous population to achieve progress on 
the West Coast of Sumatra after 1933. Still, later events do possess a certain ironic 
relevance to Roesad's fate. After the arrests of the Permi and PSII leaders, in the wake 
of the searches conducted in 1933, harsh measures were imposed by the political 
police, and conservative policies of peace and order virtually stifled the drive for 
political and religious renewal in this region.73 A constructive colonial political move 
that was wholly in tune with this conservatism was the inauguration of the 
Minangkabau Council (Minangkabauraad) in 1938, a semi-representative body with a 
mainly advisory task. Former senior members of Permi put themselves forward for 
seats on this council. In 1939, the Minangkabau nationalist Mohammed Yamin was 
elected as this council's representative in the Volksraad.74 And none other than Roesad 
gelar Soetan Perpatih acquired the estimable position of secretary. By this route, he did 
end up, after all, in a position that offered the greater intellectual freedom he had
72 ANRI, BB, inv. no. 3592, Police branch to the director of the Internal Administration Department, 
January 23,1935.
73 This movement carried on its activities in a more diffuse manner and using different channels, however. 
See Kahili "Repression and Regroupment."
74 Ibid., pp. 47-53.
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wanted. It is not entirely clear, however, whether he was not still acting, even in this 
position, as a colonial watchdog and intermediary amid processes of change. In the 
late-colonial state, the intellectual freedom to which Roesad aspired was probably an 
illusion and unobtainable, not only for the Permi leaders, but also for Roesad himself.
The ironies accumulated for Roesad after the Japanese occupation, during which he 
took on official administrative responsibilities as a member of the regional council (Shu 
Sangi-Kai). At the end of 1945, in the midst of local efforts to set up a Republican 
administration in West Sumatra, Roesad briefly occupied the highest possible position 
in West Sumatra, as he was made resident, and thus became the second-most-powerful 
leader in the newly created West Sumatran National Committee. Because Roesad was 
one of the most experienced administrators in the region, and probably because of his 
loyal ties to his former schoolmate Tan Malaka, many members of the National 
Committee supported Roesad's appointment as resident in November 1945. However, 
Roesad would not hold that post for very long. In March 1946 he resigned, for he faced 
too much popular hostility and unrest. His role as the active watchdog for two 
successive colonial regimes made him unacceptable at the lower levels of 
Minangkabau society. "’ Intellectual freedom, if possible for him at all, was an ideal 
Roesad would have to capture outside administration and politics.75 6
Finally, however, Roesad may have profited from a certain degree of freedom in 
his investigations and interrogation of colonial modernity, perhaps thanks to the 
curiosities of his employer. Although he was intellectually formed, in part, by his 
colonial schooling, and in part by his family background, Roesad did not narrow 
modernity down to one "universalizing notion of progress." It was his wish to define 
and explain change in itself, as it was registered by the elements he found most 
meaningful and remarkable in Minangkabau society: modern religious schooling, adat, 
and politics. Because of his scientific distance from his topic, which led him to a classic 
anthropological approach, and because of his closeness to his object of study—the 
world in which he grew up, lived, and worked—he made us hear how colonial 
modernity, and its many manifestations and experiences, sounded and worked at the 
time ... including how it worked for him.
75 Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, pp. 111-12; Mestika Zed et al., ed., Sumatra Barat di Panggung Sejarah 1945- 
1995, p. 22.
76 Ironically, he tried his luck in the field of education, the tool of progress and control that he had 
monitored so severely in the early 1930s. In 1950, Roesad retired from administrative work, after which he 
apparently moved to the field of higher education. Among other things, he became a member of the 
Komisariat Fakultas Hukum of Andalas University. Mestika Zed et al., ed., Sumatra Barat di panggung 
sejarah 1945-1995, p. 22.
